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Abstract. The multiterminal secret key agreement problem by pub-
lic discussion is formulated with an additional source compression step
where, prior to the public discussion phase, users independently compress
their private sources to filter out strongly correlated components for gen-
erating a common secret key. The objective is to maximize the achievable
key rate as a function of the joint entropy of the compressed sources.
Since the maximum achievable key rate captures the total amount of
information mutual to the compressed sources, an optimal compression
scheme essentially maximizes the multivariate mutual information per
bit of randomness of the private sources, and can therefore be viewed
more generally as a dimension reduction technique. Single-letter lower
and upper bounds on the maximum achievable key rate are derived for
the general source model, and an explicit polynomial-time computable
formula is obtained for the pairwise independent network model. In par-
ticular, the converse results and the upper bounds are obtained from
those of the related secret key agreement problem with rate-limited dis-
cussion. A precise duality is shown for the two-user case with one-way
discussion, and such duality is extended to obtain the desired converse
results in the multi-user case. In addition to posing new challenges in
information processing and dimension reduction, the compressed secret
key agreement problem helps shed new light on resolving the difficult
problem of secret key agreement with rate-limited discussion, by offer-
ing a more structured achieving scheme and some simpler conjectures to
prove.
Keywords: secret key agreement; source compression; rate-limited dis-
cussion; communication complexity; dimension reduction; multivariate
mutual information
1 Introduction
In Information-theoretic security, the secret key agreement problem by public
discussion is the problem where a group of users discuss in public to generate
a common secret key that is independent of their discussion. The problem was
first formulated by Maurer [34], Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1] under a private source
model involving two users who observe some correlated private sources. Rather
surprisingly, public discussion was shown to be useful in generating the secret
key, i.e., it strictly increases the maximum achievable key rate called the secrecy
capacity. Such phenomenon was also discovered in [4] in a different formulation.
Furthermore, the secrecy capacity was given an information-theoretically appeal-
ing characterization— it is equal to Shannon’s mutual information [41] between
the two private sources, assuming the wiretapper can listen to the entire public
discussion but not observe any other side information of the private sources. It
was also shown that the capacity can be achieved by one-way public discussion,
i.e., with only one of the users discusses in public.
As a simple illustration, let X0, X1 and J be three uniformly random inde-
pendent bits, and suppose user 1 observes Z1 := (X0,X1) privately while user 2
observes Z2 := (XJ, J), where XJ = X0 when J = 0 but XJ = X1 when J = 1.
If user 2 reveals J in public, then user 1 can recover XJ and therefore Z2. Fur-
thermore, since XJ is independent of J, it can serve as a secret key bit that
is recoverable by both users but remains perfectly secret to a wiretapper who
observes only the public message J. This scheme achieves the secrecy capacity
equal to the mutual information I(Z1 ∧ Z2) = 1 roughly because user 2 reveals
H(Z2|Z1) = 1 bit in public so there is H(Z2) −H(Z2|Z1) = I(Z1 ∧ Z2) bits of
randomness left for the secret key. However, if no public discussion is allowed,
it follows from the work of Ga´c and Ko¨rner [27] that no common secret key bit
can be extracted from the sources. In particular, XJ cannot be used as a secret
key because user 1 does not know whether XJ is X0 or X1. X0 and also X1 cannot
be used as a secret key either because they may not be observed by user 2 when
J = 1 and J = 0 respectively. It can be seen that, while the private sources
are clearly statistical dependent, public discussion is needed to consolidate the
mutual information of the sources into a common secret key.
The secret key agreement formulation was subsequently extended to the
multi-user case by Csisza´r and Narayan [22]. Some users are also allowed to
act as helpers who can participate in the public discussion but need not share
the secret key. The designated set of users who need to share the secret key
are referred to as the active users. Different from the two-user case, one-way
discussion may not achieve the secrecy capacity when there are more than two
users. Instead, an omniscience strategy was considered in [22] where the users
first communicate minimally in public until omniscience, i.e., the users discuss
in public at the smallest total rate until every active user can recover all the
private sources. The scheme was shown to achieve the secrecy capacity in the
case when the wiretapper only listens to the public discussion. This assumes,
however, that the public discussion is lossless and unlimited in rate, and the
sources take values from finite alphabet sets. If the sources were continuous or
if the public discussion were limited to a certain rate, it may be impossible to
attain omniscience.
This work is motivated by the search of a better alternative to the omni-
science strategy for multiterminal secret key agreement. A prior work of Csisza´r
and Narayan [21] considered secret key agreement under rate-limited public dis-
cussion. The model involves two users and a helper observing correlated discrete
memoryless sources. The public discussion by the users is conducted in a par-
ticular order and direction. While the region of achievable secret key rate and
discussion rates remains unknown, single-letter characterizations involving two
auxiliary random variables were given for many special cases, including the two-
user case with two rounds of interactive public discussion, where each user speaks
once in sequence, with the last public message possibly depending on the first.
By further restricting to one-way public discussion, the characterization involves
only one auxiliary random variable and was extended to continuous sources by
Watanabe and Oohama in [48], where they also gave an explicit characterization
without any auxiliary random variable for scalar Gaussian sources in [48]. For
vector Gaussian sources, the characterization by the same authors in [49] involv-
ing some matrix optimization was further improved in [31] to a more explicit
formula. However, if the discussion is allowed to be two-way and interactive,
Tyagi [45] showed with a concrete two-user example that the minimum total
discussion rate required, called the communication complexity, can be strictly
reduced. Using the technique of Kaspi [30], multi-letter characterizations were
given in [45] for the communication complexity and, similarly, by Liu et al. in
[32] for the region of achievable secret key rate. [32] further simplified the charac-
terization using the idea of convex envelope using the technique by Ma et al [33].
While these characterizations provide many new insights and properties, they
are not considered computable, compared to the usual single-letter and explicit
characterizations. Further extension to the multi-user case also appears difficult,
as the converse can be seen to rely on the Csisza´r sum identity [1, Lemma 4.1],
which does not appear to extend beyond the two-user case.
Nevertheless, partial solutions under more restrictive public discussion con-
straints were possible. By simplifying the problem to the right extent, new results
were discovered in the multi-user case, which has led to the formulation in this
work. For instance, Gohari and Anantharam [28] characterized the secrecy ca-
pacity in the multi-user case under the simpler vocality constraint where some
users have to remain silent throughout the public discussion. Using this result,
simple necessary and sufficient conditions can be derived as to whether a user can
remain silent without diminishing the maximum achievable key rate [7, 36, 50].
This is a simpler result than characterizing the achievable rate region because
it does not say how much discussion is required if a user must discuss. An-
other line of work [9, 19, 35, 37] follows [45] to characterize the communication
complexity but in the multi-user case. Courtade and Halford [19] characterized
the communication complexity under a special non-asymptotic hypergraphical
source model with linear discussion. [37] obtained a multi-letter lower bound
on the communication complexity for the asymptotic general source model. It
also gave a precise and simple condition under which the omniscience strategy
for secret key agreement is optimal for a special source model called the pair-
wise independent network (PIN) [40], which is a special hypergraphical source
model [18]. [9, 17] further derived some single-letter and more easily computable
explicit lower bounds, from which one can also obtain conditions for the om-
niscience strategy to be optimal under the hypergraphical source model, which
covers the PIN model as a special case. [10] considered the more general problem
of characterizing the multiterminal secrecy capacity under rate-limited public
discussion. In particular, an objective of [10] is to characterize the constrained
secrecy capacity defined as the maximum achievable key rate as a function of
the total discussion rate. This covers the communication complexity as a special
case when further increase in the public discussion rate does not increase the
secrecy capacity. While only single-letter bounds were derived for the general
source model, a surprisingly simple explicit formula was derived for the PIN
model [10]. The optimal scheme in [10] follows the tree-packing protocol in [39].
It turns out to belong to the more general approach of decremental secret key
agreement in [5, 6] inspired by the achieving scheme in [19] and the notion of
excess edge in [18]. More precisely, the omniscience strategy is applied after some
excess or less useful edge random variables are removed (decremented) from the
source. Since the entropy of the decremented source is smaller, the discussion
required to attain omniscience of the decremented source is also smaller. Such
decremental secret key agreement approach applies to hypergraphical sources
more generally, and it results in one of the best upper bounds in [35] for com-
munication complexity. However, for more general source models that are not
necessarily hypergraphical, the approach does not directly apply.
The objective of this work is to formalize and extend the idea of decremental
secret key agreement beyond the hypergraphical source model. More precisely,
the secret key agreement problem is considered with an additional source com-
pression step before public discussion where each user independently compresses
their private source component to filter away less correlated randomness that
does not contribute much to the achievable secret key rate. The compression is
such that the entropy rate of the compressed sources is reduced to under certain
specified level. In particular, the edge removal process in decremental secret key
agreement can be viewed as a special case of source compression, and the more
general problem will be referred to as compressed secrecy key agreement. The ob-
jective is to characterize the achievable secret key rate maximized over all valid
compression schemes. For simplicity, this work will focus on the case without
helpers, i.e., when all users are active and want to share a common secret key.
A closely related formulation is by Nitinawarat and Narayan [38], which charac-
terized the maximum achievable key rate for the two-user case under the scalar
gaussian source model where one of the user is required to quantize the source
to within a given rate. [46] also extended the formulation and techniques in [38]
to the multi-user case where every user can quantize their sources individually
to a certain rate. The compression considered in this work is more general than
quantizations for gaussian sources, and the new results are meaningful beyond
continuous sources.
The compressed secret key agreement problem is also motivated by the study
of multivariate mutual information (MMI) [15], i.e., an extension of Shannon’s
mutual information to the multivariate case involving possibly more than two
random variables. The unconstrained secrecy capacity in the no-helper case has
been viewed as a measure of mutual information in [11, 15], not only because
of its mathematically appealing interpretations such as the residual indepen-
dence relation and data processing inequalities in [15], but also because of its
operational significance in undirected network coding [13, 14], data clustering [8]
and feature selection [16] (cf. [20]). The optimal source compression scheme that
achieves the compressed secrecy capacity can be viewed more generally as an
optimal dimension reduction procedure that maximizes the MMI per bit of ran-
domness, which is an extension of the information bottleneck problem [44] to the
multivariate case. However, different from the multivariate extension in [25], the
MMI is used instead of Watanabe’s total correlation [47], and so it captures only
the information mutual to all the random variables rather than the information
mutual to any subsets of the random variables. Furthermore, the compression is
on each random variable rather than subsets of random variables.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem of compressed secret key
agreement is formulated in Section 2. Preliminary results of secret key agree-
ment are given in Section 3. The main results are motivated in Section 4 and
presented in Section 5, followed by the conclusion and some discussions on po-
tential extensions in Section 6.
2 Problem Formulation
Similar to the multiterminal secret key agreement problem [22] without helpers
or wiretapper’s side information, the setting of the problem involves a finite set
V of |V | > 1 users, and a discrete memoryless multiple source
ZV := (Zi|i ∈ V ) ∼ PZV taking values from
ZV :=
∏
i∈V
Zi (not necessarily finite).
N.b., letters in sans serif font are used for random variables and the corresponding
capital letters in the usual math italic font denote the alphabet sets. PZV denotes
the joint distribution of Zi’s.
A secret key agreement protocol with source compression can be broken into
the following phases:
Private observation: Each user i ∈ V observes an n-sequence
Zni := (Zit|t ∈ [n]) = (Zi1,Zi2, . . . ,Zin)
i.i.d. generated from the source Zi for some block length n. N.b., for conve-
nience, [n] denotes the set of positive intergers up to n, i.e, {1, . . . , n}.
Private randomization: Each user i ∈ V generates a random variable Ui
independent of the private source, i.e.,
H(UV |ZV ) =
∑
i∈V
H(Ui). (1)
Source compression: Each user i ∈ V computes
Z˜i = ζi(Ui,Z
n
i ) (2)
for some function ζi that maps to a finite set. Z˜V is referred to as the com-
pressed source.
Public discussion: Using a public authenticated noiseless channel, a user it ∈
V is chosen in round t ∈ [ℓ] to broadcast a message
F˜t := f˜t(Z˜it , F˜
t−1) where (3a)
ℓ is a positive integer denoting the number of rounds and F˜t−1 denotes all
the messages broadcast in the previous rounds. If the dependency on F˜t−1 is
dropped, the discussion is said to be non-interactive. The discussion is said
to be one-way (from user i) if ℓ = 1 (and i1 = 1). For convenience,
Fi := (F˜t|t ∈ [ℓ], it = i)
F := F˜ℓ = FV
(3b)
(3c)
denote the aggregate message from user i ∈ V and the aggregation of the
messages from all users respectively.
Key generation: A random variable K, called the secret key, is required to
satisfy the recoverability constraint that
lim
n→∞
Pr(∃ i ∈ V,K 6= θi(Z˜i,F)) = 0, (4)
for some function θi, and the secrecy constraint that
lim
n→∞
1
n
[log|K| −H(K|F)] = 0, (5)
where K denotes the finite alphabet set of possible key values.
N.b., unlike [45], non-interactive discussion is considered different from one-way
discussion in the two-user case since both users are allowed to discuss even
though their messages cannot depend on each other. Different from [23], there
is an additional source compression phase, after which the protocol can only
depend on the origninal sources through the compressed sources.
The objective is to characterize the maximum achievable secret key rate for
a continuum of different levels of source compression:
Definition 1. The compressed secrecy capacity with a joint entropy limit α ≥ 0
is defined as
C˜S(α) := sup lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K| (6)
where the supremum is over all possible compressed secret key agreement schemes
satisfying
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Z˜V )− α ≤ 0. (7)
This constraint limits the joint entropy rate of the compressed source.
N.b., instead of the joint entropy limit, one may also consider entropy limits on
some subset B ⊆ V that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Z˜B)− α ≤ 0. (8)
If multiple entropy limits are imposed, C˜S will be a higher-dimensional surface
instead of a one-dimensional curve. For example, in the two-user case under the
scalar gaussian source model, [38] considered the entropy limit only on one of
the users. In the multi-user case under the gaussian markov tree model, [46]
considered the symmetric case where the entropy limit is imposed on every user.
For simplicity, however, the joint entropy constraint (7) will be the primary
focus in this work. It will be shown that C˜S(α) is closely related to the constrained
secrecy capacity CS(R) defined as [10]
CS(R) := sup lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K| for R ≥ 0, (9)
with Z˜i := (Ui,Z
n
i ) instead of (2), i.e., without compression, and the entropy
limit (7) replaced by the constraint on the total discussion rate
R ≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|F | = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∑
i∈V
log|Fi|. (10)
N.b., it follows directly from the result of [22] that C˜S(α) remains unchanged
whether the discussion is interactive or not. Indeed, the relation between C˜S(α)
and CS(R) to be shown in this work will not be affected either. Therefore, for
notational simplicity, CS(R) may refer to the case with or without interaction,
even though CS(R) may be smaller with non-interactive discussion.
It is easy to show that CS(R) is continuous, non-decreasing and concave in
R [10, Proposition 3.1]. As R goes to ∞, the secrecy capacity
CS(∞) := lim inf
R→∞
CS(R) (11)
is the usual unconstrained secrecy capacity defined in [22] without the discussion
rate constraint (10). The smallest discussion rate that achieves the unconstrained
secrecy capacity is the communication complexity denoted by
RS := inf{R ≥ 0 | CS(R) = CS(∞)}. (12)
Similar to CS(R), the following basic properties can be shown for C˜S(α):
Proposition 1. C˜S(α) is continuous, non-decreasing and concave in α ≥ 0.
Furthermore,
CS(∞) = lim inf
α→∞
C˜S(α), (13)
achieving the unconstrained secrecy capacity in the limit.
Proof. Continuity, monotonicity and (13) follow directly from the definition of
C˜S(α). Concavity follows from the usual time-sharing argument, i.e., for any
λ ∈ [0, 1], α′, α′′ > 0, a secret key rate of λC˜S(α
′)+(1−λ)C˜S(1−α
′) is achievable
with the entropy limit α := λα′+(1−λ)α′′ by applying the optimal scheme that
achieves C˜S(α
′) for the first n′ := ⌊λn⌋ samples of ZnV and applying the optimal
scheme that achieves C˜S(α
′′) for the remaining n′′ := n− n′ samples.
Because of (13), a quantity playing the same role of RS for CS can be defined
for C˜S(α) as follows.
Definition 2. The smallest entropy limit that achieves the unconstrained se-
crecy capacity is defined as
αS := inf{α | C˜S(α) = CS(∞)} (14)
and referred to as the minimum admissible joint entropy.
One may also consider both the entropy limit (7) and discussion rate con-
straint (10) simultaneously, and define the secrecy capacity as a function of
α and R. For simplicity, however, we will not consider this case but, instead,
focus on the relationship between C˜S(α) and CS(R).
The following example illustrates the problem formulation. It will be revisited
at the end of Section 5 (Example 3) to illustrate the main results.
Example 1. Consider V := {1, 2, 3} and
Z1 := (Xa,Xb), Z2 := (Xa,Xb,Xc), and Z3 := (Xa,Xc), (15)
where Xa,Xb and Xc are uniformly random and independent bits. It is easy to
argue that
C˜S(α) ≥ α for α ∈ [0, 1]. (16a)
To see this, notice that Xa is observed by every user. Any choice of K = θ(X
n
a )
can therefore be recovered by every user without any discussion, satisfying the
recoverability constraint (4) trivially. Since there is no public discussion required,
the secrecy constraint (5) also holds immediately by taking a portion of the bits
from Xna to be the key bits in K. Finally, setting Z˜i = ζi(X
n
a ) = θ(X
n
a ) for all i ∈ V
ensures H(Z˜V ) ≤ H(K), satisfying the entropy limit (7) with α equal to the key
rate. Hence, C˜S(α) ≥ α as desired. Indeed, we will show (by Proposition 5) that
the reverse inequality holds in general, and so we have equality for α ∈ [0, 1] for
this example.
For α = H(ZV ) = H(Xa,Xb,Xc) = 3, every user can simply retain their
source without compression, i.e., with Z˜i = Zi for i ∈ V while satisfying the
entropy limit (7). Now, with K = (Xna ,X
n
b ) and F = F2 = X
n
b ⊕ X
n
c where ⊕
is the elementwise XOR, it can be shown that both the recoverability (4) and
secrecy (5) constraints hold. This is because user 3 can recover Xb from the XOR
Xb⊕Xc with the side information Xc. Furthermore, the XOR bit is independent
of (Xa,Xb) and therefore does not leak any information about the key bits. With
this scheme, C˜S(3) ≥ 2. By the usual time-sharing argument,
C˜S(α) ≥
{
1+α
2 for α ∈ [1, 3]
2 for α ≥ 3.
(16b)
Indeed, the reverse inequality can be argued using one of the main results (The-
orem 1) and so the minimum admissible joint entropy will turn out to be αS = 3.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, a brief summary of related results for the secrecy capacity and
communication complexity will be given. The results for the two-user case will
be introduced first, followed by the more general results for the multi-user case,
and the stronger results for the special hypergraphical source model. An example
will also be given at the end to illustrate some of the results.
3.1 Two-user case
As mentioned in the introduction, no single-letter characterization is known for
CS(R) and C˜S(α) even in the two-user case where V := {1, 2}. Furthermore,
while multi-letter characterizations for RS and CS(R) were given in [45] and [32]
respectively in the two-user case under interactive discussion, no such multi-
letter characterization is known for the case with non-interactive discussion.
Nevertheless, if one-way discussion from user 1 is considered, then the result of
[21, Theorem 2.4] and its extension [48] to continuous sources gave the following
characterization of CS(R):
CS,1(R) := sup I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z2) where
I(Z′1 ∧ Z1)− I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z2) ≤ R
I(Z′1 ∧ Z2|Z1) = 0.
(17a)
(17b)
(17c)
The last constraint (17c) corresponds to the Markov chain Z′1 − Z1 − Z2 and so
the supremum is taken over the choices of the conditional distribution PZ′
1
|Z1 =
PZ′
1
|Z1,Z2 . Using the double Markov property as in [45], it follows that CS(0) can
be characterized more explicitly by the Ga´cs–Ko¨rner common information
JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2) := sup{H(U) | H(U|Z1) = H(U|Z2) = 0} (18)
where U is a discrete random variable. If (18) is finite, a unique optimal solution
U exists and is called the maximum common function of Z1 and Z2 because any
common function of Z1 and Z2 must be a function of U. The communication
complexity also has a more explicit characterization [45, (44)]
RS,1 = JW,1(Z1 ∧ Z2)− I(Z1 ∧ Z2) where
JW,1(Z1 ∧ Z2) := inf{H(W) | H(W|Z1) = 0, I(Z1 ∧ Z2|W) = 0}
(19)
(20)
and W is a discrete random variable. If JW,1(Z1 ∧Z2) is finite, a unique optimal
solution W exists and is called the minimum sufficient statistics of Z1 for Z2
since Z2 can only depend on Z1 through W.
In Section 4, the expression CS,1(R) will be related to the compressed secret
key agreement restricted to the two-user case when the entropy limit is imposed
only on user 1. This duality relationship in the two-user case will serve as the
motivation of the main results for the multi-user case. Indeed, the desired char-
acterization of C˜S(α) for the two-user case has appeared in [38, Lemma 4.1] for
the scalar gaussian source model:
C˜S,1(α) := sup I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z2) where
I(Z′1 ∧ Z1) ≤ α
I(Z′1 ∧ Z2|Z1) = 0.
(21a)
(21b)
(21c)
For the general source model, the expression (21) has also appeared before with
other information-theoretic interpretations as mentioned in [24]. The lagrangian
dual of (21), in particular, reduces to the dimension reduction technique called
the information bottleneck method in [44], where Z1 is an observable used to
predict the target Z2, and Z
′
1 is a feature of Z1 that captures as much mutual
information with the target variable as possible per bit of mutual information
with the observable. Interestingly, the principal of the information bottleneck
method was also proposed in [42, 43] as a way to understand deep learning,
since the best prediction of Z2 from Z1 is nothing but a particular feature of Z1
sharing a lot of mutual information with Z2.
3.2 General source with finite alphabet set
Consider the multi-user case where |V | ≥ 2. If ZV takes values from a finite set,
then the unconstrained secrecy capacity was shown in [22] to be achievable via
communication for omniscience (CO) and equal to
CS(∞) = H(ZV )−RCO, (22)
where RCO is the smallest rate of CO [22] characterized by the linear program
RCO = min
rV
r(V ) such that
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \B) ∀B ( V,
(23a)
(23b)
where r(B) denotes the sum
∑
i∈B ri. Further, RCO can be achieved by non-
interactive discussion. It follows that
RS ≤ RCO, or equivalently
CS(R) = CS(∞) R ≥ RCO.
(24a)
(24b)
It was also pointed out in [22] that private randomization does not increase
CS(∞). Hence, if ZV is finite, we have
αS ≤ H(ZV ) (25)
because CS(∞) can be achieved with Z˜i = Zi. While it seems plausible that
randomization does not decrease RS nor increase CS(R) for any R ≥ 0, a rigorous
proof remains elusive. Similarly, it appears plausible that neither αS nor C˜S(α)
are affected by randomization but, again, no proof is known yet.
An alternative characterization of CS(∞) was established in [11, 18] by show-
ing that the divergence bound in [22] is tight in the case without helpers. More
precisely, with Π ′(V ) defined as the set of partitions of V into at least two
non-empty disjoint sets, then
CS(∞) = I(ZV ) := min
P∈Π′(V )
IP(ZV ), where
IP (ZV ) :=
1
|P| − 1
D
(
PZV
∥∥∥∥∥
∏
C∈P
PZC
)
=
1
|P| − 1
[∑
C∈P
H(ZC)−H(ZV )
]
.
(26a)
(26b)
In the bivariate case when V = {1, 2}, I(ZV ) reduces to Shannon’s mutual
information I(Z1 ∧ Z2). It was further pointed out in [15] that I(ZV ) is the
minimum solution γ to the residual independence relation
H(ZV )− γ =
∑
C∈P
[H(ZC)− γ] (27)
for some P ∈ Π ′(V ). To get an intuition of the above relation, notice that
γ = 0 is a solution when the joint entropy H(ZV ) on the left is equal to the
sum of entropies H(ZC)’s on the right for some partition P . In other words,
the MMI is the smallest value of γ removal of which leads to an independence
relation, i.e., the total residual randomness on the left is equal to the sum of
individual residual randomness on the right according to some partitioning of
the random variables. It was further shown in [15] that there is a unique finest
optimal partition to (26a) with a clustering interpretation in [8]. The MMI is
also computable in polynomial time, following the result of Fujishige [26].
In the opposite extreme with R→ 0, it is easy to argue that
CS(0) ≥ JGK(ZV ) (28)
where JGK(ZV ) is the multivariate extension of the Ga´cs–Ko¨rner common infor-
mation in (18)
JGK(ZV ) := sup{H(U) | H(U|Zi) = 0 ∀i ∈ V } (29)
with U again chosen as a discrete random variable. Note that, even without
any public discussion, every user can compress their source independently to Un
where U is the maximum common function if JGK(ZV ) is finite. Hence, it is easy
to achieve a secret key rate of H(U) = JGK(ZV ) without any discussion. The
reverse inequality of (28) seems plausible but has not been proven yet except in
the two-user case. The technique in [21] which relies on the Csisza´r sum identity
does not appear to extend to the multi-user case to give a matching converse.
3.3 Hypergraphical sources
Stronger results have been derived for the following special source model:
Definition 3 (Definition 2.4 of [18]). ZV is a hypergraphical source w.r.t.
a hypergraph (V,E, ξ) with edge functions ξ : E → 2V \ {∅} iff, for some inde-
pendent edge variables Xe for e ∈ E with H(Xe) > 0,
Zi := (Xe | e ∈ E, i ∈ ξ(e)) for i ∈ V. (30)
In the special case when the hypergraph is a graph, i.e., |ξ(e)| = 2, the model
reduces to the pairwise independent network (PIN) model in [40]. The hyper-
grahical source can also be viewed as a special case of the finite linear source
considered in [12] if the edge random variables take values from a finite field.
For hypergraphical sources, various bounds on RS and CS(R) have been de-
rived in [9, 10, 35, 37]. The achieving scheme makes use of the idea of decremental
secret key agreement [5, 6], where the redundant or less useful edge variables are
removed or reduced before public discussion. This is a special case of the com-
pressed secret key agreement, where the compression step simply selects the
more useful edge variables up to the joint entropy limit.
For the PIN model, it turns out that decremental secret key agreement is
optimal, leading to a single-letter characterization of RS and CS(R) in [10]:
RS = (|V | − 2)CS(∞).
CS(R) = min
{
R
|V | − 2
, CS(∞)
}
for R ≥ 0.
(31a)
(31b)
It can be verified that (31a) is the smallest value of R such that CS(R) =
CS(∞) using (31b). While the proof of converse, i.e., ≤ for (31b), is rather
involved, the achievability is by a simple tree packing protocol, which belongs
to the decremental secret key agreement approach that removes excess edges
unused for the maximum tree packing. In other words, the achieving scheme
is a compressed secret key agreement scheme. This connection will lead to a
single-letter characterization of C˜S(α) for the PIN model (in Theorem 2).
To illustrate the above results, a single-letter characterization for CS(R) will
be derived in the following for the source in Example 1. It will also demonstrate
how an exact characterization for CS(R) can be extended from a PIN model to
a hypergraphical model via some contrived arguments. The characterization will
also be useful later in Example 3 to give an exact characterization of C˜S(α).
Example 2. The source defined in (15) in Example 1, for instance, is a hy-
pergraphical source with E = {a, b, c}, ξ(a) = {1, 2, 3}, ξ(b) = {1, 2} and
ξ(c) = {2, 3}. By (23), we have RCO = 1 with the optimal solution r1 = r3 = 0
and r2 = 1. This means that user 2 needs to discuss 1 bit to attain omniscience.
In particular, user 2 can reveal the XOR Xb⊕Xc so that user 1 and 3 can recover
Xc and Xb respectively from their observations. By (24b), then, we have
CS(R) = CS(∞) = H(ZV )−RCO = 2 for R ≥ RCO = 1. (32)
It can also be checked that the alternative characterization of CS(∞) in (26)
gives
CS(∞) = I(ZV ) =
1
2
[
H(Z1) +H(Z2) +H(Z3)−H(Z{1,2,3})
]
= 2.
Next, we argue that
CS(R) = 1 +R for R ∈ [0, 1]. (33)
The achievability, i.e., the inequality CS(R) ≥ 1+R, is by the usual time-sharing
argument. In particular, the bound CS(0.5) ≥ 1.5, for example, can be achieved
by the compressed secret key agreement scheme in Example 1 with α = 2, i.e., by
time-sharing the compressed secret key agreement schemes for α = 1 and for α =
3 equally. More precisely, we set Z˜1 = (X
n
a ,X
⌊n/2⌋
b ), Z˜2 = (X
n
a ,X
⌊n/2⌋
b ,X
⌊n/2⌋
c ),
Z˜3 = (X
n
a ,X
⌊n/2⌋
c ), K = (Xna ,X
⌊n/2⌋
b ) and F = F2 = X
⌊n/2⌋
b ⊕ X
⌊n/2⌋
c . It follows
that the public discussion rate is lim supn→∞
1
n log|F | = 0.5.
Now, to prove the reverse inequality ≤ for (33), we modifies the source ZV to
another source Z′V defined as follows with an additional uniformly random and
independent bit Xd:
Z′1 := (Xa,Xb), Z
′
2 := (Xa,Xb,Xc,Xd), and Z
′
3 := (Xc,Xd).
N.b., Z′V is different from ZV , namely, Z
′
2 is obtained from Z2 by adding Xd,
and Z′3 is obtained from Z3 by adding Xd and removing Xa. It follows that Z
′
V
is a PIN. By (26) and (31b), the constrained secrecy capacity for the modified
source Z′V is
C′S(R) = min{R, 2}.
The desired inequality is proved if we can show that
C′S(R + 1) ≥ CS(R).
To argue this, note that, if user 2 reveals F′2 = Xa ⊕ Xd in public, then user 3
can recover Xa. Furthermore, F
′
2 does not leak any information about Xa, and
so the source Z′V effectively emulates the source ZV . Consequently, any optimal
discussion scheme FV that achieves CS(R) for ZV can be used to achieve the
same secret key rate but after an additional bit of discussion F′2. This gives the
desired inequality that establishes (33).
4 Multi-letter characterization
We start with a simple multi-letter characterization of the compressed secrecy
capacity in terms of the MMI (26).
Proposition 2. For any α ≥ 0, we have
C˜S(α) = sup lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Z˜V ) (34)
where the supremum is over all valid compressed source Z˜V satisfying the joint
entropy limit (7).
Proof. This is because the compressed secrecy capacity is simply the secret key
agreement on a compressed source. Hence, by (26), the MMI on the compressed
source gives the compressed secrecy capacity. ⊓⊔
The characterization in (34) is simpler than the formulation in (6) because it
does not involve the random variables F and K, nor the recoverability (4) and se-
crecy (5) constraints. Although such a multi-letter expression is not computable
and therefore not accepted as a solution to the problem, it serves as an interme-
diate step that helps derive further results. More precisely, consider the bivariate
case where V = {1, 2}. Then, (34) becomes
C˜S(α) = sup lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Z˜1 ∧ Z˜2) where
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Z˜1, Z˜2)− α ≤ 0
(35a)
(35b)
If in addition the joint entropy constraint (35b) is replaced by the entropy con-
straint on user 1 only, i.e.,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Z˜1)− α ≤ 0, (35c)
then C˜S(α) can be single-letterized by standard techniques as in [21] to C˜S,1(α)
defined in (21). The following gives a simple upper bound that is tight for suffi-
ciently small α.
Proposition 3. C˜S,1(α) defined in (21) is continuous, non-decreasing and con-
cave in α ≥ 0 with
C˜S,1(α) ≤ α. (36)
Furthermore, equality holds iff α ≤ JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2).
Proof. Monotonicity is obvious. Continuity and concavity can be shown by the
usual time-sharing argument as in Proposition 1. (36) follows directly from the
data processing inequality that I(Z′1 ∧Z2) ≤ I(Z
′
1 ∧Z1) under the Markov chain
Z′1 − Z1 − Z2 required in (21c). If α ≤ JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2), then there exist a feasible
solution U to (18) (a common function of Z1 and Z2) with H(U) ≥ α, and so the
compressed sources Z˜1 and Z˜2 can be chosen as a function of U
n to achieve the
equality for (36). Conversely, suppose JGK(Z1 ∧Z2) is finite and (36) is satisfied
with equality. Then, in addition to Z′1 − Z1 − Z2, we also have Z
′
1 − Z2 − Z1,
which implies by the double Markov property that, for the maximum common
function U achieving JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2) defined in (18),
I(Z′1 ∧ Z1,Z2|U) = 0 (or Z
′
1 − U− (Z1,Z2)).
In other words, the optimal Z′1 is a stochastic function of the maximum common
function of Z1 and Z2, and so α = I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z2) ≤ JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2) as desired. ⊓⊔
We will show that the above upper bound in (36) extends to the multi-user case
(in Proposition 5). However, for α ≥ JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2), the above upper bound is
not tight even in the two-user case. To improve the upper bound, the following
duality between C˜S,1 and CS,1 will be used and extended to the multi-user case
(in Theorem 1).
Proposition 4. For α ≥ JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2),
C˜S,1(α) = CS,1(α− C˜S,1(α)). (37)
Furthermore, the set of optimal solutions to the left (achieving C˜S,1(α) defined in
(21)) is the same as the set of optimal solutions to the right (achieving CS,1(R) in
(17) with R = α− C˜S,1(α)). It follows that the minimum admissible entropy (12)
but with the entropy constraint on user 1 instead is
αS,1 = RS,1 + I(Z1 ∧ Z2) = JW,1(Z1 ∧ Z2) (38)
where RS,1 and JW,1(Z1 ∧ Z2) are defined in (19) and (20) respectively.
Proof. Set R = α − C˜S,1(α). Consider first an optimal solution Z
′
1 to C˜S,1(α)
and show that it is also an optimal solution to CS,1(R). By optimality,
I(Z′1 ∧ Z2) = C˜S,1(α). (39)
By the constraint (21b), I(Z′1 ∧ Z1) ≤ α. It follows that the constraint (17b)
holds, and so Z′1 is a feasible solution to CS,1(R), i.e., we have ≥ for (37) that
C˜S,1(α) ≥ CS,1(α− C˜S,1(α)). (40)
To show that Z′1 is also optimal to CS,1(R), suppose to the contrary that there
exists a strictly better solution Z′′1 to CS,1(R), i.e., with
I(Z′′1 ∧ Z2) > I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z2) = C˜S,1(α). (41)
It follows that
I(Z′′1 ∧ Z1) > I(Z
′ ∧ Z1) = α. (42)
The last equality means that the constraint (21b) is satisfied with equality. If to
the contrary that the equality does not hold, setting Z′1 to be Z
′′
1 for some fraction
λ > 0 of time gives a better solution to CS,1(R), contradicting the optimality
of Z′1. The first inequality can also be argued similarly by the optimality of Z
′
1.
Now, we have
I(Z′′1 ∧ Z2)− I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z2)
I(Z′′1 ∧ Z1)− I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z1)
(a)
≤
I(Z′1 ∧ Z2)
I(Z′1 ∧ Z1)
(b)
≤ 1,
where (a) is by the concavity of C˜S,1(α); and (b) is by the upper bound C˜S,1(α) ≤
α in (36). N.b., equality cannot hold simultaneously for (a) and (b) because,
otherwise, we have
I(Z′′
1
∧Z2)
I(Z′′
1
∧Z1)
= 1, which, together with (41) and (42), contradicts
the result in Proposition 3 that C˜S,1(α) < α (with strict inequality) for α >
JGK(Z1 ∧ Z2). Hence,
I(Z′′1 ∧ Z2)− I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z2)
I(Z′′1 ∧ Z1)− I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z1)
< 1,
which, together with (41) and (42), implies
I(Z′′1 ∧ Z1)− I(Z
′′
1 ∧ Z2) > α− C˜S,1(α) = R
contradicting even the feasibility of Z′′1 to CS,1(R), namely, the constraint (17b)
with Z′1 replaced with Z
′′
1 . This completes the proof of the optimality of Z
′
1 to
CS,1(R).
Next, consider showing that an optimal solution Z′1 to CS,1(R) is also optimal
to C˜S,1(α). Then,
I(Z′1 ∧ Z1) ≤ R+ I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z2) = α− C˜S,1(α) + CS,1(R) ≤ α
where the first inequality is by (17b); the second equality is by the optimality of
Z′1; and the last inequality follows from (40). Hence, the constraint (21b) holds
and so Z′1 is a feasible solution for C˜S,1(α). If to the contrary that we have a
better solution Z′′1 for C˜S,1(α), then Z
′′
1 can be shown to be a feasible solution
for CS,1(R), contradicting the optimality of Z
′
1. ⊓⊔
5 Main Results
The following extends the single-letter upper bound (36) in Proposition 3 to the
muli-user case.
Proposition 5. C˜S(α) ≤ α with equality if α ≤ JGK(ZV ).
Proof. The upper bound C˜S(α) ≤ α is because nC˜S(α) cannot exceed the un-
constrained secrecy capacity for the compressed source Z˜V , which, by (22) and
(7), is upper bounded by H(Z˜V ) ≤ n [α+ δn] for some δn → 0 as n→∞.
Next, to prove the equality condition is sufficient, suppose α ≤ JGK(ZV ).
Then, each user can compress their source directly to a common secret key at
rate α without any public discussion. Hence, C˜S(α) = α as desired. ⊓⊔
N.b., unlike the two-user case in Proposition 3, the equality condition above
in terms of the multivariate Ga´cs–Ko¨rner common information is sufficient but
not shown to be necessary. Nevertheless, necessity seems very plausible, as there
seems to be no counter-example that suggests otherwise.
As in Proposition 4, a duality can be proved in the multi-user case, relating
the compressed secret key agreement problem to the constrained secrecy key
agreement problem.
Theorem 1. With CS(R) and RS defined in (9) and (12) respectively, we have
αS ≥ RS + CS(∞)
C˜S(α) ≤ CS(α− C˜S(α))
(43a)
(43b)
for all α ≥ 0.
Proof. (43a) can be obtained from (43b) by setting α = αS as follows:
CS(∞)
(a)
≥ CS(αS − C˜S(αS))
(b)
≥ C˜S(αS)
(c)
= CS(∞)
where (b) is given by (43b) with α = αS; while (a) and (c) follows directly from
(11), (13) and monotonicity. It follows that the inequalities (a) and (b) hold
with equality. In particular, equality for (a) means that CS(R) = CS(∞) for
R ≥ αS − C˜S(αS) = αS − CS(∞), implying (43a) as desired.
To show (43b), consider an optimal compressed secret key agreement scheme
achieving C˜S(α) with an arbitrary entropy limit α. It suffices to show that the
discussion rate need not be larger than α− C˜S(α). Let Z˜V be the optimal com-
pressed source and R˜CO be the smallest rate of communication for omniscience
of Z˜V , which is given by (23) with ZV replaced by Z˜V . The discussion rate for
the omniscience strategy is
1
n
R˜CO =
1
n
[
H(Z˜V )− I(Z˜V )
]
by (22). This simplifies to α− C˜S(α) as desired in the limit n→∞. N.b., since
the omniscience strategy is non-interactive, the desired hold even if CS and RS
are defined with non-interactive discussion. ⊓⊔
While it is obvious from the above proof that a compressed secret key agree-
ment scheme can be used as a constrained secret key agreement scheme, yielding
one of the best lower bounds for CS(R) in [10], the above result also means that
a converse result on constrained secret key agreement can be applied to com-
pressed secret key agreement. Upper bounds on C˜S(α) may be obtained from
the upper bounds for CS(R) such as those in [10]. It turns out that this ap-
proach can give better upper bounds which, surprisingly, is tight for the PIN
model as mentioned in Section 3.3. This leads to the following exact single-letter
characterization of C˜S(α).
Theorem 2. For the PIN model in Definition 3,
αS = (|V | − 1)CS(∞)
C˜S(α) = min
{
α
|V | − 1
, CS(∞)
} (44a)
(44b)
for all α ≥ 0.
Proof. (44a) follows easily from (44b) by setting the two terms in the mini-
mization to be equal and solving for α. To show (44b), note that, by (31b), we
have
C−1S (γ) = (|V | − 2)γ ∀γ < CS(∞)
because CS(R) is non-decreasing and concave, and so it must be strictly non-
decreasing before it reaches CS(∞) = CS(∞). Now, by (43b),
α− C˜S(α) ≥ C
−1
S (C˜S(α))
= (|V | − 2)C˜S(α)
for any α ≥ 0 such that C˜S(α) < CS(∞), i.e., for α ≤ αS , and so C˜S(α) ≤
α
|V |−1 .
This implies ≤ for (44b). The bound is achievable by the same achieving scheme
in [10, Theorem 4.4] along the idea of decremental secrecy key agreement and the
tree packing protocol in [39]. More precisely, every (|V |−1) bits of edge variable
forming a spanning tree are turned into a secret key bit by the tree packing
protocol. This results in the factor of (|V |− 1) in (44), which corresponds to the
number of edges in a spanning tree. ⊓⊔
For the more general source model, the idea of decremental secret key agree-
ment needs to be refined because there need not be any edge variables to remove.
The following is a simple extension that leads to a single-letter lower bound on
C˜S(α).
Theorem 3. A single-letter lower bound on C˜S(α) is
C˜S(α) ≥ I(Z
′
V |Q) (45)
for any random vector (Q,Z′V ) taking values from a finite set and satisfying
I(Q ∧ ZV ) = 0
H(Z′i|Zi,Q) = 0 ∀i ∈ V
H(Z′V |Q) ≤ α.
(46a)
(46b)
(46c)
Furthermore, it is admissible to have |Q| ≤ 3.
Proof. By (46b), we have Z′i = ξi(Zi,Q) for some function ξi. W.l.o.g., let Q :=
{1, . . . , k} for some integer k > 0. Choose Z˜i to be the following function of Zni :
Z˜i = ((ξi(Ziτ , q) | nq−1 < τ ≤ nq) | 1 ≤ q ≤ k) where
n0 = 0 and nq =
n q∑
j=1
PQ(j)
 for 1 ≤ q ≤ k.
Basically, Q acts as a time-sharing random variable where PQ(q) is the fraction
of time the source Zi is processed to Z
(q)
i := ξi(Zi, q), for 1 ≤ q ≤ k. More
precisely, we have
nq−nq−1
n converge to PQ(q), and so
1
n
I(Z˜V ) =
k∑
q=1
I(Z
(q)
V )
nq − nq−1
n
n→∞−−−−→ I(Z′V |Q).
Similarly,
1
n
H(Z˜V )
n→∞−−−−→ H(Z′V |Q) ≤ α
by (46c), satisfying the entropy limit (7). Hence, Z˜V is a valid compressed source,
the unconstrained capacity of which is I(Z′V |Q), leading to the desired lower
bound (45).
The condition that |Q| ≤ 3 is admissible follows from the usual argument by
the well-known Eggleston–Carathe´odory theorem. More precisely, let
S := {(I(Z′V |Q = q), H(Z
′
V |Q = q)) |PZV |Q=q = PZV ,
H(Z′i|Zi,Q = q) = 0}.
It can be seen that the conditions above are equivalent to (46a) and (46b) re-
spectively, and so the set of feasible values to (46), namely
(I(Z′V |Q), H(Z
′
V |Q)) =
∑
q∈Q
PQ(q)(I(Z
q
V ), H(Z
q
V )),
is equal to the convex hull of S . Since the dimension of S is at most 2, the pair
(C˜S(ZV ), α) can be obtained as a convex combination of at most 3 points in S
as desired by the Eggleston–Carathe´odory theorem. ⊓⊔
The main results above can be illustrated as follows using the hypergraphical
source in Example 1 given earlier. In particular, an exact single-letter character-
ization of C˜S(α) will be derived, even though such an exact characterization is
not known for general hypergraphical sources.
Example 3. Consider the source defined in (15) in Example 1. It will be shown
that (16a) and (16b) are satisfied with equality, which gives the desired single-
letter characterization of C˜S(α).
It is easy to show that JGK(ZV ) = 1 since Xa is the maximum common
function of Z1, Z2 and Z3. Hence, the reverse inequality of (16a) follows from
Proposition 5.
The reverse inequality for (16b) can be argued using the bound in Theorem 1
by CS(R) and the characterization of CS(R) in Example 2. More precisely, by
(32), that the unconstrained secrecy capacity CS(∞) = 2. Then, by (33), we
have C−1S (γ) ≤ γ − 1 for all γ ≤ CS(∞) = 2. Now, by (43b),
α− C˜S(α) ≤ C
−1
S (C˜S(α)) ≤ C˜S(α) − 1
and so C˜S(α) ≤
1+α
2 for C˜S(α) ≤ 2. This completes the proof.
6 Conclusion and Extensions
Inspired by the idea of decremental secret key agreement and its application
to the constrained secret key agreement problem, we have formulated a multi-
terminal secret key agreement problem with a more general source compression
step that applies beyond the hypergraphical source model. This formulation al-
low us to separate and compare the issues of source compression and discussion
rate constraint in secret key agreement. While a single-letter characterization of
the compressed secrecy capacity and admissible entropy limit remains unknown,
single-letter bounds have been derived and they are likely to be tight for the hy-
pergraphical model, and possibly more general source models such as the finite
linear source model [12]. For the PIN model, in particular, the bounds are tight,
giving rise to a complete characterization of the capacity in Theorem 2. One way
to improve the current converse results is to show whether the equality condition
in Proposition 5 is necessary, that is, C˜S(α) < α for α > JGK(ZV ). By the duality
in Theorem 1, the condition is necessary if one can show that CS(0) = JGK(ZV ),
i.e., (28) holds with equality. Such equality can be proved for hypergraphical
as well as finite linear sources by extending the lamination techniques in [10].
It is hopeful that a complete solution can be given for the finite linear source
model and the well-known jointly gaussian source model. The bounds (43) in
the duality result may plausibly be tight for these special sources, in which case
non-interactive discussion suffices to achieve the constrained secrecy capacity.
The current achievability results may also be improved. In particular, for the
two-user case with joint entropy constraint (35), the lower bound in (45) can be
improved to C˜S(α) ≥ max I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z
′
2) where I(Z
′
1 ∧ Z1) + I(Z
′
2 ∧ Z2) ≤ α and
Z′1−Z1−Z2−Z
′
2. Whether this improvement is strict or is the best possible is not
clear yet but an extension to the multi-user case seems possible. A related open
problem is to characterize the CS(R) in the two-user case with two-way non-
interactive discussion. A simpler question is whether two-way non-interactive
discussion can be strictly better than one-way discussion.
As pointed out before, by regarding the secrecy capacity as a measure of mu-
tual information, an optimal source compression scheme translates to a dimen-
sion reduction technique potentially useful for machine learning. A closely related
line of work is the study of the strong data processing inequality in [2, 3, 24],
in particular, the ratio s∗(Z1;Z2) := sup
I(Z′
1
∧Z2)
I(Z′
1
∧Z1)
where, as in (21), the supre-
mum is taken over the choice of the conditional distribution PZ′
1
|Z1,Z2 such that
Z′1−Z1−Z2 forms a Markov chain and I(Z
′
1∧Z) > 0. It is straightforward to show
that supα≥0
C˜S(α)
α for the two-user case in (35) is upper bounded by s
∗(Z1;Z2)
and s∗(Z2;Z1). However, a sharper bound and a more precise mathematical con-
nection may be possible, and the result may be extended to the multivariate case.
Furthermore, the linearization considered in [29] may potentially be adopted to
provide a single-letter lower bound on the compressed secrecy capacity. As in
[2, 32], the problem may also be related to a notion of maximum correlation
appropriately extended to the multivariate case.
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